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SUMMARY
Forest concessions in Central Africa are being subjected to a combination of pressures from agribusiness investments, population growth and 
the informalisation of the domestic timber trade. This puts them at a crossroad. Despite REDD+, the forest sector is not a policy priority for 
governments whose ambition is to achieve emerging country status. This article takes stock of the forest concessions and management rules 
in Central Africa, the slow progress of forest certification, and the difficulties facing the FLEGT/VPAs process, and proposes a preliminary 
assessment of the impact of the log export ban imposed in Gabon since 2011. Examples are given of the mounting influence of Asian companies, 
and the growing concentration of large corporate interests. The concession regime must be restructured to include multiple uses and take better 
account of local land rights inside and outside the concessions. The legitimacy of forest concessions depends on their transparency, their strict 
compliance with laws and regulations, and their provision of social and ecological guarantees. Certification has been a lever for improving the 
practices and the self-regulation of certified companies. Recognising the public interest of certification would legitimate financial and non-
financial incentives for companies to become certified, and international transfers may contribute to the implementation of such incentives.
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Récentes évolutions de la situation et de la dynamique des concessions forestières en Afrique 
centrale
A. KARSENTY et C. FERRON
Les concessions forestières en Afrique centrale sont sujettes à un ensemble de pressions simultanées découlant du développement de l’agro-
business, de la croissance de la population et l’informalisation croissante de l’exploitation du bois d’œuvre pour alimenter les marchés locaux. 
Les concessions forestières sont à la croisée des chemins. Malgré REDD+, le secteur forestier n’est pas une priorité politique pour les gouver-
nements de la région, lesquels visent «l’émergence» rapide de leurs économies. Cet article fait le point sur l’état actuel des concessions et les 
règles de gestion forestières en Afrique centrale, la difficile progression de la certification et les difficultés rencontrées par les processus FLEGT 
et les Accords de Partenariat Volontaires avec l’UE. Il propose également une première analyse des impacts de la mesure d’interdiction 
d’exporter des grumes prise par le Gabon. La montée en puissance des compagnies asiatiques et la tendance à la concentration des intérêts 
commerciaux est mise en évidence. Pour surmonter les défis croissants, le régime concessionnaire doit évoluer pour prendre en compte les 
droits et usages multiples des ressources et du foncier au sein et hors des concessions. La légitimité des concessions dépend de leur transparence, 
de leur strict respect des règles légales, et des garanties qu’elles peuvent fournir du point de vue de leur impact écologique et social. La certifi-
cation a constitué un levier pour l’amélioration des pratiques et l’autorégulation des entreprises certifiées. La reconnaissance de la certification 
comme instrument d’intérêt public pourrait légitimer la mise en place d’incitations, financières ou non, pour que les concessions se certifient, 
et des transferts internationaux compensatoires pourraient contribuer à cela.
Evolución reciente de la situación y dinámica de las concesiones forestales en África Central
A. KARSENTY y C. FERRON
Las concesiones forestales en África Central están siendo sometidas a una mezcla de presiones procedentes de las inversiones de agroempresas, 
el crecimiento de la población y la informalización del comercio nacional de madera. Esta mezcla las pone en una encrucijada. A pesar 
de REDD+, el sector forestal no es una prioridad política para los gobiernos, cuya ambición es lograr el estatus de país emergente. En este 
artículo se hace un balance de las concesiones forestales y las normas de gestión en África Central, el lento avance de la certificación forestal 
y las dificultades a las que se enfrenta el proceso de AVA FLEGT, y propone una evaluación preliminar del impacto de la prohibición de la 
exportación de madera en Gabón desde el 2011. El artículo da ejemplos de la influencia creciente de las empresas asiáticas y la concentración 
cada vez mayor de grandes intereses corporativos. Es necesaria una restructuración del régimen de concesiones que incluya los usos múltiples 
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This article on Central Africa takes stock of the status and 
the evolution of large-scale industrial forest concessions 
that often cover dozens of thousands of hectares, are run by 
private or, less frequently, public companies, and produce 
timber largely for export. Some companies are vertically inte-
grated with transformation units nearby the forest concession, 
some have their wood processing units located in towns, and 
some just produce logs. 
The text provides an analysis of the legal, institutional and 
technical aspects, concessions regime, examines the strengths 
and the weaknesses of the current concessions regime, and 
discusses the possible evolution of this regime in Central 
Africa.
METHODOLOGY
This article is based on a report on forest concessions in West 
and Central Africa the author prepared for the FAO (Karsenty 
2016). The recent information has been collected by five 
expert missions on the political economy of the forest sector 
in Gabon, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
and Congo (Rep. of) between 2013 and 2015. Most of the 
information was obtained through interviews with forest and 
fiscal administrations, concessionaires and NGOs and from 
non-distributable documents. For Gabon, first-hand informa-
tion of the impact of the log export ban was collected on site 
in May 2015; this information has been completed by a FRMi 
study for the World Bank released by early 2017. 
RESULTS
Defining forest concessions
According to the FAO Land Tenure Thesaurus (Ciparisse 
et al. 2003), a concession is a bilateral or unilateral legal act 
by which an authority grants a private or public personal use 
right or a privilege. 
More precisely, Gray (2002) defined a forest concession 
as “a contract between a forest owner and another party 
permitting the harvesting (forest utilization contracts) and/or 
managing (forest management services contracts) of specified 
resources from a given forest area”. However, it is useful 
to notice that concessions and especially forest concessions 
involve the idea of achieving also a public work or service, 
at the own expense of the concessionaire. For instance, prepa-
ration of forest management plans has been for a long time 
considered as a responsibility of the Government, through the 
forest service in West and Central Africa (and some Forest 
y que establezca mejores formas de tener en cuenta los derechos locales a la tierra, tanto dentro como fuera de las concesiones. La legitimidad 
de las concesiones forestales depende de su transparencia, de su estricto cumplimiento de las leyes y reglamentos y de su provisión de garantías 
sociales y ecológicas. La certificación ha sido una palanca con la que mejorar las prácticas y la autorregulación de las empresas certificadas. El 
reconocimiento del interés público de la certificación legitimaría los incentivos financieros y no financieros para que las empresas se certifiquen, 
y las transferencias internacionales pueden contribuir al establecimiento de tales incentivos.
INTRODUCTION
Forest concessions are an important tool for sustainable forest 
management (SFM), especially considering that the majority 
of forests in tropical countries are public (Sunderlin et al. 
2008, Siry et al. 2015). Forest concessions for timber produc-
tion have been the primary channel for allocating harvesting 
rights for tropical forests in developing countries and in 
several developed countries with temperate and boreal forests 
(Gray 2002). 
The forest concession concept gained traction in the last 
decade and was introduced in highly forested countries such 
as Brazil (Karsenty et al. 2008) and Russia (Torniainen et al. 
2006), where governments intended to use this regime to 
avoid leaving large tracts of forests under ambiguous tenure 
situations which facilitated appropriation through illegal 
(but often tolerated) deforestation. On the other hand, the 
increased population density in much of the rural tropical 
areas and the legitimate claims to forestlands often consid-
ered as public/state estates challenged the existence of forest 
concessions. Many analysts consider that concessions should 
be dismantled and replaced by community forests, which 
are supposed to provide more benefits to local populations 
(Counsell and Labrousse 2007, Alemagi 2010, Alden Wily 
2011). But running a viable community-based timber 
enterprise is not an easy task, particularly in places where 
infrastructures are decrepit, transport costs are high, and 
markets are difficult to access, especially with competition 
from a growing informal sector that delivers (illegal) timber 
at a lower cost on the domestic markets (Ezzine de Blas 
et al. 2009).
Forest concessions are at a crossroad. Their legitimacy 
rests on their transparency, their strict compliance with laws 
and regulations, and the social and ecological conditions they 
can guarantee. Public policies promoting forest management 
and private certification schemes have improved – albeit 
unevenly – the quality of management of industrial forest 
concessions in many African countries (Samyn et al. 2011, 
Cerutti et al. 2011, Mégevand et al. 2013). However, in 
numerous concessions there is still some doubt about the 
effectiveness of the application of legally requested manage-
ment plans. 
To cope with structural changes of structure of exploited 
forests, the wood processing industry will have to innovate to 
avoid the erosion of financial profitability, which can already 
be observed in many concessions that comply with the new 
set of management rules. Moreover, the concessions will have 
to accept change that accommodates local land tenure claims 
and shares more benefits with local populations.
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Codes are still mentioning this), but this responsibility has 
been transferred to the concessionaires (except in Central 
African Republic), given the lack of capacity of the forest 
service and the companies’ expected lack of confidence in 
the management inventories that would be performed by the 
administration. Likewise, social obligations of the conces-
sionaires have gradually increased into the specifications; in 
Congo, the management plans of one major company embod-
ied provisions to ensure the “food security” of his workers 
and their family. In that respect, the concession agreement is 
typical of the modern “public-private” partnerships by which 
public services obligations are devolved to private companies 
along with the privilege of an economic activity requiring 
government’s authorization.
In Central Africa, forest lands are generally considered as 
“public”, even though some countries such as Cameroon have 
a specific land status (called “domaine national”) where the 
State is not the owner of the land, but a trustee administering 
the land for the benefit of the nation. This status is “by 
default”, since a land without land title is considered as part 
of the national domain. For a land to become private, it needs 
a procedure called “immatriculation” (titling), often long 
and costly. Titling is open to individuals, companies, land 
councils or the State. A land titled to the name of the State is 
transferred to the “private domain of the State”. The govern-
ment can also decide to designate some forest to be “public 
domain”, such as it is the case in Gabon and DRC for 
protected areas – even though, strictly speaking, the public 
domain should be put at the disposal of the public – which is 
not the case with most protected areas.
The forest legislation added another layer on the legal land 
status, by designating forests according to their planned uses. 
The instrument for such designation is the “gazetting” 
(“classement” in French). In an ideal scheme, all gazetted 
forests should form the “permanent forests”, also called 
“permanent forest estate” or “domaine forestier permanent”. 
Gazetted forests can be for production or protection. 
The use of the two instruments, titling and gazetting, has 
rarely followed a clear line of distinction. Since forests were 
generally controlled by the forest services in virtue of the 
“forester regime” that restricted the use rights, the fact they 
were not formally owned by the State inasmuch they were not 
titled was often overlooked by the administration. Gazetting 
is used in Cameroon not only to allocate the forest in the per-
manent forest estate but also to title it for the private domain 
of the State (Kamto 2001). This is possible only because 
in Cameroon’ legal framework, permanent forests are also 
private domain of the State – or of a local council; but such a 
situation is a matter of choice, and it is possible to foresee 
permanent forests under communal property, even if no 
country has gone this way so far.
Importance of the industrial concessions in Central 
Africa
Central Africa has a long history with concessions given 
the fact the forest land is, formally at least, controlled by the 
government and because of the difficulties of implementing 
“modern” private property in societies where the communi-
tarian dimension of land and forest tenure prevents the devel-
opment of large-scale individual properties. Concessions in 
Africa have a long history and mixed records. Initially, under 
colonial era, European Governments granted concessionaires 
a given – and generally huge – area on which they received 
privileges to use natural resources as private assets, the trade 
monopoly on resources they gathered, and often the right to 
levy taxes and use hard labour. After the independences, the 
relationship between private actors and the State evolved into 
a more balanced one (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2001).
Today, there are similarities associated with the weakness 
of the states, the marginalization of some areas and the lack 
of infrastructure. Companies are in charge of various 
missions which are normally the responsibility of the public 
sector, from inventories of the forest to social services for the 
FIGURE 1 A glimpse on forest concession areas in Central Africa (source: FRMi)
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local populations. For a long time, concessionaires who 
received their logging rights from the Government have 
been aware that they had to accommodate with their social 
environment to avoid conflicts. The cornerstone of the inter-
face between concessionaires and populations are the contract 
specifications (cahier des charges). Such specifications were 
automatically associated with the concession contract itself 
and embodied various requirements such as silvicultural and 
industrial obligations along with social ones.
The concentration of FMUs in the hands of large compa-
nies is reflected by figure 2.
In the DRC, the concentration is possibly more important 
since the Soforma and Sodefor groups have the same main 
shareholder, a Holding called NordSud Timber, based in 
Liechtenstein and the two groups have exchanged FMUs 
and industrial units in a recent past. Currently, the company 
that weighs the most in DRC is Cotrefor, which exploits as 
a contractor the permits attributed to Motema (owned by a 
Congolese high-ranking officer). Cotrefor-Motema partner-
ship accounted for two thirds of the formal industrial timber 
production in DRC in 2016 (Agedufor-AFD 2017). 
For Congo, several sources mention also strong commer-
cial ties between Taman, CIBN and the large Malaysian 
company, Rimbunan Hijau. 
If we consider these companies are partners, then we can 
identify a quartet of companies/partners with exploiting very 
large areas. Large foreign companies still dominate forestry 
in Central Africa. However, the last decade has been marked 
by the rise of African companies in Cameroon, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea and the DRC. There are also a couple of 
significant Gabonese concessionaires. But, these companies 
are smaller than the foreign ones, and they are sometimes 
dependant of some foreign companies for their export (e.g. 
Congolese and Asian companies in the southern Congo).
Managing the concessions
Management plans are mandatory in all countries and their 
implementation should be seen as a prerequisite for keeping 
the concession. The reality is far from this principle, and it is 
very likely that a majority of non FSC-certified concessions 
(or certification of legal sourcing or timber, even though less 
stringent) do not implement fully their management plans, 
and many do not implement it at all.
Timber management
In African moist tropical natural forests, logging is highly 
selective, due to (i) the high diversity of species and their 
heterogeneity with respect to their processing aptitude and 
markets demand, (ii) the high transport costs, often dependent 
on road operations. In Central Africa, the volume of commer-
cial timber extracted rarely exceeds 10–13 m3/ha on average 
for the area exploited annually (in some cases, concentration 
of commercial species lead to local harvests of several dozens 
of cubic meters per hectare), . . . and is often around 4–8 m3 
(0.5 tree per hectare) – for instance in the DRC. This corre-
sponds approximately to 4 to 8% of the standing volume (all 
species). The volume damaged is a function of the intensity of 
the exploitation and the implementation of Reduced Impact 
Logging (RIL) practices (even though RIL has only marginal 
effects when extraction rates are very low). In average, log-
ging activities damage 7 to 10% of the surface area (Durrieu 
de Madron et al. 2000), which is significantly less than what 
has been observed in South-East Asia, for instance. On the 
other hand, the low volume harvested generally does not open 
the canopy enough to allow light-demanding species to renew 
their population. This is an issue, since most of the popular 
commercial species such as Sapelli (Entandrophragma 
TABLE 1 Synthesis of the area covered by concessions and areas certified in 2016–20171
Dense 
forests 
(COMIFAC 
official 
figures for 
20082)
Concessions
Concessions 
with a manage-
ment plan
Certified concessions 
(FSC or legal 
timber)
FSC 
certified
FSC 
certified as 
% of all 
conces-
sions
FSC certified 
as % of 
concessions 
with a 
management 
plan
Area 
(million ha) Area (ha) Nbr Area (ha) % Area (ha)
% of all
concess.
Area (ha) % %
Cameroon 6.4 7,058,958 111  5,071,000  72 3,409,593 48 1,130,301 16 22
Congo 14.3 12,600,221  51  4,671,691  37 3,061,243 24 2,478,943 20 52
Gabon 21 14,272,630 150  7,181,420  50 2,435,511 17 2,042,616 14 28
Eq. Guinea 1.9 740,000  48
CAR 4.6 3,058,937  11  3,058,937 100 0  0
DRC 98.9 12,184,130  80   1,976,6173  16 828,033  7  0
Total 157 49,914,876 451 21,959,665  44 9,734,380 20 5,651,860 11 33
1Compilation of various sources (OFAC-State of the Forest www.observatoire-comifac.net/pages/monitoring_system/concessions.php; 
PPECF/COMIFAC/KFW internal document; FSC database August 2017; AGEDUFOR internal document) 
2Source: De Wasseige et al. 2009.
3Validated plans in August 2017. An additional 2.8 million ha of area under management plan is pending.
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FIGURE 2 Area concentrated by main concessionaires in Central Africa (Source: author, based on various sources)
FIGURE 3 Area and proportion of concessions with a management plan (in million hectares and % of total attributed concessions)
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1
 In many dense forest with closed canopies, inventories show that light-demanding species, although numerous in mature trees diameters, are 
scarce in the smallest diameters classes, announcing a change in the forest composition. 
2
 For more details, see http://www.atibt.org/download/i/mark_dl/u/4012517735/4612072401/Manuel_ATIBT_4e_volet_certification.pdf (in 
French).
cylindricum), Okoumé (Aucoumea klaineana), Ayous 
(Triplochiton scleroxylon) are light demanding, and this low 
rate of tree removal does not create favourable conditions for 
their renewal1. Management plans set targets increasing the 
number of species harvested and the volume extracted, but the 
actual harvest is still concentrated on a handful of well-known 
species. Few former less-used species have become popular in 
the past 20 years, an exception being the Okan (Cylicodiscus 
gabunensis), a hardwood being used in water-based applica-
tions, which has been substituted for the Azobé (Lophira 
alata) now in shorter supply.
In Central Africa, the two pillars of the silvicultural 
system are the Minimum Harvesting Diameter (MHD) and 
the cutting cycle. Management plans are based on a “manage-
ment inventory” (sampling of 1–3% in general of all species) 
to be done during the three first years of the concession 
contract: the concessionaire is allowed to cut the Annual 
Allowable Cut (AAC, expressed in area but also on volume 
based on the exploitation inventory) during the “provisional 
management convention” of the concession granted for 
3 years during which time he has to prepare the management 
plan before being granted with the full convention. Those 
inventories allow for estimating the annual possibility, the 
geographical sparing of the trees (to define the future AACs) 
and the diametric distribution of the population, needed for 
assessing the dynamic of renewal of the various species and 
set the MHDs.
Management plans are to be prepared by the concession-
aire, except in CAR where a public structure prepares the 
plan, which is paid nonetheless by the concessionaire. 
According to several anecdotal feedbacks, the ownership of 
management plans by the concessionaire in CAR is, there-
fore, limited and questions can be raised about their full 
implementation. In Central Africa, management plans should 
cover the duration of the cutting cycle. These plans are 
reviewed each 5 or 10 years. In addition, short-term manage-
ment plans are to be prepared for a 5 years period. 
• Cutting cycles are of 25 years in Congo and Gabon, 
30 years in Cameroon. In CAR, the duration is 
determined by the management plan, between 20 years 
(secondary forests) and 30 years (primary-like for-
ests). Cutting cycles and rotations are aligned.
• MHDs are set by the management plan, after examina-
tion of the diameter structure of the commercial 
species. In any case, the national rule imposes an 
“administrative MHD”, and the “management MHDs” 
cannot be set below the administrative MHD. The 
“Management MHD” can be set up to 120 cm if 
the species shows a deficit of number in the small 
diameters. In general, management plans in certified 
concessions set “management MHDs” 10 to 30 cm 
higher than the “administrative MHDs”2.
• The AACs are set in two phases. In Cameroon, Gabon, 
CAR and Congo, the concession is subdivided into 
5-years blocs of almost equal volume (based on infor-
mation of the management plan), and then divided into 
5 plots of almost the same surface (the AAC). 
• In Cameroon, CAR, and Gabon an AAC is open for 
3 years (2 years in Congo) and then closed for the 
duration of the cutting cycle. In Central Africa, before 
the opening of an AAC, the concessionaires have 
to perform a 100% pre-harvest inventory (all the 
commercial species above 20 cm diameter), which 
will allow mapping the trees to be harvested.
• Based on exploitation inventories, lists of trees to be 
harvested and the volumes are proposed to the admin-
istration, which validates it (or not) and delivers the 
annual authorization of logging. In general, conces-
sionaires should not harvest more than what has been 
agreed (with a margin of tolerance in some countries). 
In some management plans (certified companies), 
there is also a cap set on a voluntary basis for harvest-
ing intensity by surface unit. In the Pokola FMU (CIB-
Olam, Congo) it is 2.5 trees/ha and 45 m3/ha, based on 
25 ha units. In CEB-Precious Wood (Gabon), there is 
a cap of 3 trees per ha.
• Regeneration rates are set by species or group of spe-
cies. They vary from 50% to 75% of the stumpage vol-
ume. If the simulations following the management in-
ventory suggest that species (or group of species) will 
not be recovered at the specified rate, the MHD must 
be raised.
• Post-harvesting silvicultural treatments are not in 
force in Central Africa. It is generally considered that 
the most important silvicultural actions are associated 
with the harvest itself, with the raising of the MHD 
when deemed necessary for the reconstitution. 
Removal of lianas and removal of so-called secondary 
species to favour young commercial trees are still 
controversial and not practiced, except in experimental 
devices. Enrichment plantations in logging gaps are 
considered as too expensive to manage over time.
Sustainability of harvests without silvicultural operations 
is, however, questioned in central Africa. Simulations over 
2–3 felling cycles suggests some key commercial species 
(which are also light-demanding species) will not be recov-
ered, even without considering the initial high volume called 
“bonus” derived from the exploitation in primary-like forests 
(Karsenty and Gourlet-Fleury 2006) and their volumes will 
slightly decrease over the felling cycles – without the species 
being threatened. The traditional response would be to raise 
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the MHDs of such species, but it would create important 
financial troubles for the companies. On the other hand, given 
the extremely selective logging practiced in Central Africa, 
many trees potentially marketable remain untouched and it 
is likely the market demand for timber will evolve (along 
with the processing technologies) and domestic markets will 
develop over the time of 2–3 felling cycles (50–60 years and 
more), hence the logging characteristics (diversification of 
exploited species). Therefore, the issue of sustainability of the 
best current practices remains an open question. 
Fauna management
Management of the fauna is an issue more and more empha-
sised in the management plans, especially for certified 
concessions. Some studies concluded that fauna (such as 
elephants) were better off in concessions in Northern Congo 
than outside the concessions (Stokes et al. 2010). Manage-
ment plans should contain provisions for the management of 
the biological diversity, the protection of endangered species 
and the sustainability of wild meat resources consumed by 
local populations as a major protein source.
In certified concessions the management plans contain 
provisions for participatory zoning of the hunting areas, espe-
cially with indigenous people who rely strongly on wild meat 
and are allowed to practice their traditional hunting activities 
(except in areas were any hunting is prohibited). Rules are 
established for preventing hunting by outsider (such as 
control of the log trucks, closing of the forest roads not in use, 
prohibition of road traffic at night, etc.). The plans contain 
also provisions for monitoring of the dynamic population of 
large mammals and a follow-up of the impact of the hunting 
practiced by local populations.
Employment
Our estimates, based on interviews with sub-regional officials 
and the private sector, indicate that concessions and the wood 
processing industry provide direct formal employment to 
over 40,000 people in Central Africa, The breakdown is as 
follow: 11,500 in Cameroon, 10,650 in Gabon, 7,500 in 
Congo, 6,000 in DRC, 4,000 in CAR. No figure is available 
for Equatorial Guinea, but a reasonable estimation would be 
around 2,000. To this figure, add indirect formal employment 
in transport, port handling, and other flexible activities, which 
can be reallocated to other commodity chains. For Cameroon, 
Cerutti et al. (2016a) estimated the existence of 23,000 of 
such permanent formal jobs related directly and indirectly to 
the timber activity.
The informal sector is likely to provide many more jobs in 
populated countries such as DRC and Cameroon, according 
to estimates by Cerutti and Lescuyer (2001): more than 
45,000 jobs in Cameroon, up to 25,000 permanent jobs in 
DRC (Lescuyer et al. 2014), and probably many more if non-
permanent jobs are included. One unique trait of jobs in the 
industrial timber sector is that they are among the rare formal 
activities available in remote and economically marginalized 
areas (the forest zones), and target non-skilled people. It is 
estimated that one permanent job in Central Africa supports 
10–12 relatives.
Other social dimensions 
With the relative democratization of West and Central African 
countries in recent years, the multiplication of NGOs and the 
importance given internationally to the fate of forest-dwelling 
populations, the social dimension of the specifications now 
tends to prevail. Typically, specifications contain provisions 
for delivering social investments benefiting local populations 
such as building and/or equipping schools and healthcare 
facilities, building local roads and bridges to facilitate access 
to villages, drilling wells, and supplying building materials 
to populations. In some cases, provisions are more extensive 
and not only benefit local populations but also provincial 
authorities, local units of ministries in charge of forests, and 
sometimes the central ministry itself. 
Relations between forest companies and local populations 
are often subject to conflicts, but the picture given by damn-
ing reports is often one-sided and the issue may not be as 
simple as once thought. The creation of a forest concession 
also used by local populations for agriculture, gathering, 
hunting, fishing and other practices is certainly a recipe for 
trouble. Yet, the arrival of logging companies is often hailed 
– above all by local populations themselves – as a significant 
economic opportunity in remote and landlocked areas. Poten-
tial benefits include direct and indirect individual employ-
ment opportunities and a range of socio-economic benefits 
to be negotiated with the company on a collective basis. 
Demands and expectations of local populations usually cover 
the following elements (CED 2008):
• Medicine and equipment of healthcare centres;
• Contribution to local education through building or 
funding schools;
• Employment and training for young men from nearby 
villages; 
• Distribution of food and beverage, frequently referred 
to as cadeaux (presents); 
• Construction or maintenance of roads; and
• In some cases, provision of additional public infra-
structure such as electricity and wells.
Several large Central African concessions have reached 
agreements with conservation NGOs to enrich management 
plans with a section on wildlife management that includes 
measures deemed “conservative and repressive” by Doucet 
et al. (2002), such as hunting management plans with autho-
rization to hunt on foot in the vicinity of settlements of 
forestry employees, the ban on hunting in work places and on 
bushmeat transport, etc. 
Disappointing experiences with log export bans
Partial or total log export bans (LEB) have been introduced in 
several countries. Cameroon and Congo allocate log export 
quotas to companies, but the control of such quotas is 
not strictly enforced, especially in Congo. On the other hand, 
Gabon instituted a full log export ban in 2010, and it is 
enforced.
Recent evolutions of forest concessions status and dynamics in Central Africa  17
• In Cameroon, the “traditional species” (generally 
redwood) must be transformed within the country, 
but the main species harvested, Ayous (Triplochiton 
scleroxylon), can be exported as logs against the pay-
ment of an extra tax. In 2009–2010, the government 
temporarily allowed the log exports of traditional 
species to boost exports. Today, this authorization 
no long applies and around 1/3 of the industrial log 
production is exported as logs. Quotas of log export 
rights for Ayous and Azobé (Lophira alata) have been 
introduced, but the allocation of these quotas is discre-
tionary and entails governance issues. 
• In Congo, the concessionaires are requested to process 
locally at least 85% of their log production. This obli-
gation is respected by the certified companies, but not 
by most of the other companies. In 2010, the govern-
ment authorised the transferability of the implicit 15% 
quota of authorized log exports. But the public author-
ities find it difficult to manage this system because 
of the malfunctioning system of information sharing 
between the various services of the ministry in charge 
of forests and the custom services. In the last years, 
around 35% of the log production has been exported as 
logs (more than double the 15% quota).
• In Equatorial Guinea, a presidential decree was issued 
in 2007, prohibiting log exports. After the issuance of 
the decree, all the concessions were cancelled and only 
short-term permits were delivered. Production plum-
meted, from more than 500,000 m3 in 2007 to 13,700 
m3 in 2009 (see fig 4). By the end of 2008, the presi-
dential decree was abrogated de facto, and log exports 
resumed. The prominent company, Shimmer Interna-
tional, a subsidiary of the large Malaysian company 
Rimbunan Hijau, returned to the forest sector to export 
logs again. Certified companies (certification of legal-
ity) are allowed to export up to 50% of their produc-
tion. The others have to pay 5,000 FCFA (USD 0.85) 
per cubic meter for log exports. In 2013, 11 companies 
shared 740,122 ha, structured as 48 concessions 
(which are very small areas).
The 1997 Forest law of Equatorial Guinea caps the 
production at 450,000 m3 annually, a limit that clearly was not 
respected up to 2008. Since that time, the production forest-
lands (Bosques Nacionales) have diminished substantially 
and the government reduced them from 1.67 million in 1997 
to 740,000 ha in 2013, as the oil production was increasing. 
• In CAR, the forest code requires concessionaires to 
remain operational for at least 3 years and to process at 
least 60% of their production. A subsequent Finance 
Law raises this threshold to 77%, but the law is barely, 
rarely enforced. 
• In the DRC, only mill owners are allowed are allowed 
to export logs, and may not export more than 30% 
of their production. Here again, the law is poorly 
enforced
Log export bans for the most valuable species have an 
economic cost, when specific qualities of logs – usually the 
highest quality, but also low-grade timber in demand as logs 
on Asian markets – are processed rather than exported as is. 
The economic cost is generated by low processing efficiency 
which causes some processed products (sawnwood and 
plywood) to lose economic value compared to their potential 
selling price as logs on the international market (opportunity 
FIGURE 4 Evolution of timber production in Equatorial Guinea (thousands of cubic meters) (Source: WRI – Atlas forestal 
interactivo de la República de Guinea Ecuatorial)
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perimeter of profitability of logging shrunk, and several 
concessions stopped or reduced their activities, especially if 
they did not have enough processing capacity. 
Almost all the companies suffered financial losses up to 
2013. Through restructuring, high international log prices for 
the African timber, and an active domestic market for high-
quality logs (for peeling), a handful of companies became 
profitable again in 2013–2104, but had to absorb the losses of 
the previous years (debts) which depressed their investment 
capacity. New sawmills (and some peeling units) have been 
built, thereby raising the installed processing capacity (input) 
of transformation to 2.6 million m3, which means that overca-
pacity will remain until log production reaches its earlier 
levels. The employment, according to figures from the Minis-
try of Forest Economy, is slightly above the pre-log export 
ban situation: 10,650 employees in 2014 against 9,588 in 
2009 (World Bank/FRMi 2017). But this accounts only for 
direct employment, without factoring in the indirect employ-
ment (log transport, port facilities. . .) that has been lost in the 
meantime (probably several hundreds, but there are no figures 
available). Fiscal receipts, essentially based on taxation of log 
exports, dropped dramatically: although the forest taxes (area, 
felling and export taxes) yielded in the past around 40 billion 
FCFA on average (USD 65 million, and even 75 million in 
2009), in 2014 the “Direction Générale des Impôts” provides 
the figure of 7 billion FCFA (USD 12.5 million) only (World 
Bank/FRMi 2017). 
The government expected all the logs under the export ban 
to be transformed into plywood, veneers and sawnwood – 
or into furniture. But the international competitiveness of 
those Gabonese processed products is limited, as Gabon has 
relatively high production costs (wages, port handling. . .). In 
addition, given the narrowness of the domestic market, the 
opportunity for producing and commercializing by-products 
is also limited, and overall wood recovery rates are not 
cost). This difference in relative prices derives from the strong 
demand of more efficient sawmills abroad, struggling to 
secure their supply of logs becoming more and more scarce. 
On the other hand, not all local processing entails a loss of 
added value, as there are in Central Africa efficient plants able 
to fetch high prices for their productions. In that respect, log 
export bans can produce perverse incentives since they incite 
logging companies to acquire poor processing equipment 
simply to comply with the law, as was stated in a recent study 
on Gabon (World Bank/FRMi 2017). And the impossibility to 
export tends to decrease log prices on the domestic market, 
thus allowing inefficient sawmills to remain competitive thanks 
to the low price of the raw material (as long as the timber 
resource can meet the needs of industry in the country). 
What varies also is the income distribution. With a higher 
volume of export logs, a greater part of the forest rent goes 
to the Public Treasury, since taxation is heavier on logs than 
on processed products. Under a log export ban, the fiscal 
receipts drop (see the Gabon case in the next section) but 
governments hope there will be more employment, which is 
not systematically happening (again see Gabon case).
Ghana’s recent experiences with the log export ban: facing 
a logjam
In 2010, the Government of Gabon decided to ban log exports 
as of 2011. This was quite surprising, since Gabon was the 
largest log exporter of Africa, and was not well known for its 
industrial skills. The impact has been significant on the forest 
sector. Timber production dropped sharply and dramatically. 
The usual production figures for Gabon (source: ITTO) were 
around 3.2 to 3.5 million m3, the 2012 production was just 
1.7 million m3 and the 2015 figure is likely to be around 
1.5 million m3 (World Bank/FRMi 2017) The profitability of 
the timber activity overall, turned negative, since the financial 
margins were linked essentially to log exports. Therefore, the 
3
 Some companies obtain high recovery rates on the main products by selecting only the highest quality logs for processing. In this case, 
processing efficiency would be higher, but so would be the opportunity cost associated with logs which are not exported.
Box 1: The opportunity cost of the log export ban
The average declared FOB price of Sapelli sawnwood exported from Cameroon is listed at €605 per m3 by ITTO-Market News 
Service in July 2015). The FOB price for Congo Basin Sapelli logs was listed as €320 per m3 for “B” quality by ITTO-MNS 
at that same time (Sapelli cannot be exported as logs from Cameroon). The recovery rate in simple sawmills (i.e. without 
drying facilities or industrial carpentry for by-products re-utilization) is 36% on average, which mean one needs 2.78 m3 of 
logs to produce 1 m3 of sawnwood. This also means that the log equivalent value of exported sawnwood is €218 [sawnwood 
price / input volume of logs], to compare with the actual FOB price of €320 for logs exported from, say, Congo. Even though 
the sawn log was of the lowest commercial quality (BC/C, listed at €240 exported as logs by ITTO), there would be an 
opportunity cost of €22 [€240 minus €218], without accounting for the energy needed to run the sawmill3. 
In other words, Sapelli logs which have been processed in these mills could have been exported for a minimum of €664 and 
up to €886 (B grade), instead of the €600–610 value yielded by the export of 1 m3 of sawn Sapelli. A recovery rate of 52% 
would be needed to formally nullify the opportunity cost of exporting sawnwood rather than logs, without accounting for the 
energy and the depreciation of machines used. By marketing by-products, wood processors can increase the overall recovery 
rate (even though the value of by-products does not equate that of the main product) and earn more money by transforming 
rather than importing logs. Obviously, the reasoning is even more relevant for those wood processors focusing on “non-
commodity” productions, such as furniture. In any case, one can guess that, given the heterogeneity of the timber industry, a 
total log export ban generates opportunity costs for most of the less efficient wood processors.
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region, in spite of REDD+ (or due to the declining expecta-
tions vis-à-vis this scheme). In Central Africa, economic 
growth is associated largely with the extractive industries, and 
to a lesser extent to the large-scale expansion of perennial 
crops, such as palm oil trees, rubber, wood and cocoa. Mining 
permits (exploration and exploitation) have a legal (and 
political) priority over forest concessions. Many concessions 
are overlapped by mining permits, causing difficulties to 
follow management plans and, in some cases, abandonment 
of certification. Governments are also aggressively promoting 
agri-business, often at the expense of the concessions – as in 
Cameroon, where the Government balks at signing the gazett-
ing acts for incorporating all the concessions in the Permanent 
Forest Estate (Ongolo and Karsenty 2015). 
One part of the concession forest sector in Africa is more 
and more “externally driven” in terms of ecological and social 
norms, because of the concern of Western consumers and 
public opinion about the fate of tropical forests in connection 
to global climate change. This creates incentives to raise the 
environmental standards of the global forest industry, and 
favours large scale concessions that can cope with the strin-
gent requirements embodied in legal certification and log 
progressing. In addition, in 2010 the government pledged to 
create a 40 billion FCFA (USD 65 million) fund to support 
investments in processing but has not yet done so. 
There have been significant changes in the ownership of 
the concessions. Many middle size players whose activities 
were based on log exports left the profession or had no choice 
but to supply large wood processing units at lower prices. 
Some Asian newcomers took over existing companies or 
decided to invest in processing facilities in the newly created 
Special Economic Zone (free of tax) of Nkok4. On the other 
hand, the Olam company, which is associated with the 
government for running the Special Economic Zone devoted 
initially to timber, decided to retire from the forestry business 
and sold its business to a Chinese company.
DISCUSSION
A lower policy priority
Forest concessions and the timber sector in general have 
received a lower policy priority in the last 5–10 years in the 
4
 Fiscal privileges include a 10-year exemption from corporate tax and another five years at a 10% tax rate. There is no customs duty for 25 
years for imported materials and the export of manufactured goods. The companies are exempt from VAT for 25 years and will receive a 50% 
discount on their electricity costs. The benefits also include free transfer of funds and flexible employment regulations for foreign workers.
FIGURE 5 Log exports by Central Africa’s countries (Source: author’s compilation of various sources. LEB = Log Export Ban, 
CAR: Central African Republic)
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and the industrial production are now in the hands of Asian 
companies (Karsenty 2010). Since profitability is low for 
companies that comply with the regulations, many European 
companies have sold their holdings to Asian companies which 
are sometimes less concerned about regulations and have 
more effective trading networks, with buyers advancing up 
to one third of the cost of filling their contract. This is also 
why forest management certification has not been further 
developed, even though some newcomers in Gabon (such as 
the Chinese KHLL, which took over Olam-Bois concessions 
in Gabon) claim they are interested by certification. Given 
that Asian companies often re-export semi-finished products 
made with African timber for the European or US market, 
these companies are considering the need to, at least, obtain 
legality certification to facilitate re-export.
Almost all “primary” or “primary-like” productive forests 
that could be exploited within the “perimeter of profitability” 
(depending mainly on transport infrastructures) of the forest-
land in Central Africa disappeared around 2010. All the 
forests have been more or less “secondarised” meaning the 
“primary forest rent” has been largely dissipated by the first 
felling cycle. As a consequence, profits are less than they have 
been in the past and the industry has started to restructure to 
adapt to the new availability of commercial species.
tracking, sustainable forest management certification, social 
care for local populations, and significant fiscal contribution. 
This capacity of certification to improve the quality of 
forest management in spite of the poor governance generally 
surrounding the forest sector, confirms the hypothesis of 
Cashore et al. (2004) that certification may be, to a certain 
extent, a substitute for ineffective public policies. On the 
other hand, this can squeeze out small operators, who often 
become, or remain, “informal” to avoid overregulation and 
the related corruption. In countries where the potential for 
domestic markets is low, producers face strong competition 
from other countries, corporations and business models. 
Concentration and restructuring of the export market on the 
one hand, and fragmentation of the domestic market on the 
other, seem to be the current trend in the logging industry of 
the Congo Basin.
The thrust of Asian companies and non-European 
markets
The markets for African timbers have profoundly changed 
during the last 15 years. China, and increasingly other emerg-
ing Asian markets are replacing the traditional western 
outlets, and especially the EU market. The result is that Asia 
is gradually taking over from Europe, and most of the area 
FIGURE 6 In Gabon, the log export ban entailed a sharp drop of the production and overcapacities for wood processing (data: 
ITTO Annual Statistics On-Line)
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Unlike what happened in South-East Asia, where relative 
homogeneity of stands in dipterocarp forests allowed the 
commercial species to be grouped under well-known names 
(e.g. Meranti), and harvests were intense,, there are many 
potentially marketable species left in the logged forests 
of Central Africa. Important investments in processing and 
marketing will be required to re-create opportunities for a 
new economic rent, but the “insiders” (current concession-
aires) are generally not wealthy enough to finance this 
investment and there is a big question mark about potential 
“outsiders” willing to invest in Africa’s forest sector.
As for trade, timber exports to Asia and Middle East are 
increasing, at the expense of the EU. In 2009, Cameroon 
exported to the EU28 almost twice the volume (Roundwood 
equivalent) it sent to Asia, by 2015 the volumes exported to 
both areas were almost the same (FAO/CIFOR 2016). In 2015 
Gabon exported twice more, in volume, of processed products 
to China than to the EU. And for Congo, the volume exported 
to China was, in Roundwood equivalent, 550,000 m3 in 
2015 against 430,000 m3 the same year for the EU28 (own 
calculations based on UN Comtrade statistics).
FLEGT/VPAs initiatives and private certification5: from 
complementarity to competition?
Along with deforestation, the legality of timber entering 
the world market has been the topic at the top of the tropical 
forestry agenda for some years. Through the Voluntary Part-
nership Agreements (VPA), the European Union is offering to 
help producer countries correct their legal systems, reinforce 
their monitoring capacities, and, the decisive step, ensure 
independent certification of national systems of legality 
verification so that timber exported to the European Union 
would be entitled to benefit from Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade, or FLEGT, certifications, thus 
guaranteeing European importers that that they are putting 
legally harvested timber onto the market. Since March 2013, 
the Timber Regulation of the European Union (EUTR) 
requires importers to exercise due diligence to ensure that the 
timber that they want to import presents no significant risk of 
illegal production. This has led to added constraints on the 
players in the supply chain, to be overcome by buying tropical 
timber with FLEGT certifications, whenever available. 
Although six countries (including five African nations) 
implement the VPAs, only Indonesia has, so far, proved able 
to perfect a national system of verification and traceability 
that is deemed sufficiently watertight to allow for the emis-
sion of the first FLEGT authorisations in 2016. This achieve-
ment poses a great challenge to the African exporters who 
may lose market shares in the EU if they cannot offer their 
clients FLEGT-licensed products soon.
The FLEGT program and the VPAs proposed by the EU 
are facing huge difficulties in Central Africa. The difficulty 
of ensuring and verifying all the timber production at the 
national level has been underestimated both by the EU and by 
the African governments who have, in some countries, pushed 
for also including also the domestic market in the scope of the 
VPA agreements (and not just exports to the EU), a surely 
excessive ambition, even in a mid-term perspective. 
For their part, firms for which Europe is still a major 
market have adopted private systems. Other legality certifica-
tion schemes (OLB, TLTV, VLO/VLC. . .) have been put on 
the market since the entry in force of the EUTR. They are less 
costly and somehow compete with “good management” (e.g. 
FSC) certification. Professional associations have appealed to 
the national authorities in charge of applying the EUTR in 
different EU countries to accept that there are negligible risks 
of illegality when importers put timber onto the market with 
such private certifications. But the European authorities baulk 
5
 FSC is the only scheme certifying good forest stewardship so far in Central Africa. There are other schemes (PEFC/PAFC) but with no clients 
as yet.
TABLE 3 Most significant change in ownership, from European to Asian company
Country Name of the company Successive owners Current owner
Congo Compagnie Industrielle des Bois (CIB) Initially French, then German, 
then Danish, then Asian 
Olam (Singapore, with majority Indian 
shareholders)
Congo
Cameroon
Thanry-Congo
Thanry-Cameroon
(In Gabon CEB-Thanry was taken over 
by Precious Wood – Switzerland)
French, then Chinese VicWood (HK)
Gabon Société des Bois de Lastourville (SBL) French, then Chinese (2014) Sun Company 
Gabon Leroy-Gabon, POGAB French, then Portuguese, then 
Chinese, then. . .
Legal conflict between the former 
Chinese owner and Ghassan Bitar 
(Lebanese) who bought Plyrosol, the 
factory in France 
Congo SOCOBOIS German, then Chinese Asia-Congo Industries
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at adopting a solution of this kind, which would weaken the 
efforts within the VPA framework to reinforce national 
institutions and improve governance. In particular, this would 
acknowledge the fact that private certification systems, paid 
for by the companies themselves, could perform as well as 
the ambitious – and very expensive – FLEGT program that 
has become the much-trumpeted cause of the European 
Commission (EC) for rescuing the tropical forests.
In addition to the reluctance of the EC to accept private 
certification of legality as sufficient for being FLEGT-licensed 
if national schemes are not operational, it has been suggested 
(e.g. Hinrichs and Van Helden 2012) that full implementation 
of public forest regulations, thanks to FLEGT, would be a 
significant move toward SFM, given the provisions incorpo-
rated in the new generation of forest laws, which request high 
standards forest management plans and social specifications 
aiming at sustainability. This raises the question of precise 
criteria for assessing SFM beyond the general principles 
proposed by the certification schemes (Karsenty and Gourlet-
Fleury 2016). If countries, considering or having signed VPAs 
are able to obtain FLEGT licenses in the coming years, the 
added value of forest certification, such as certification by the 
FSC, may be contested by European timber buyers who are 
often reluctant to pay premium prices. 
The thorny issue of Intact Forest Landscapes
Internal discussions within the FSC tend to focus on the 
Congo basin, with pressure exercised to strengthen the 
requirements for the industrial concessions, especially with 
the introduction of the “Intact Forest Landscapes” (IFL) con-
cept, pushed notably by Greenpeace, in spite of the scepticism 
of scientists vis-à-vis the capacity of this concept to capture 
critical issues (fauna condition, resilience of the forest after 
selective logging. . .) for determining which are the most 
biodiverse and fragile forests (Haurez et al. 2017).
The FSC General Assembly to be held in 2017 may 
impose a logging ban on “Intact Forest Landscapes” that 
could force some FSC-certified concessionaires having such 
landscapes within their concessions to leave the FSC for the 
PEFC/PAFC, an alternative currently pushed by stakeholders. 
FRMi has produced a map crossing concessions and “Intact 
Forest Landscapes” in Central Africa. It shows the magnitude 
of the issue (see fig. 5). 
Concessionaires believe this will practically prevent 
exploitation under FSC certification in many forests in 
Congo, Cameroon and Gabon. In Congo, 42% of the “Intact 
Forest Landscapes” are located in the concession areas, 54% 
in Cameroon, 63% in Gabon and 74% in Central African 
FIGURE 7 Map of the Intact Forest Landscapes and their impact on the concessions (source: FRMi)
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Republic. Consequently, some of them consider abandoning 
the FSC and look for a PEFC alternative (through the 
Pan-African Forest Certification scheme, PAFC, initiated in 
the beginning of the 2000s but without client, and taken over 
some years ago by the PEFC). But the potential disaffiliation 
of several large companies with the FSC might have a 
significant impact on their exports to Europe and North 
America, since opponents to industrial concessions will 
certainly claim that the PEFC/PAFC certificate does not 
provide the same environmental guarantees, as they do not 
consider the “Intact Forest Landscapes”.
Unlikely benefits of REDD+ for rewarding better 
management of forest concessions
REDD+ will probably not benefit the forest concessions, 
despite the “Sustainable Management of Forest” eligibility 
activity associated with the “+” of REDD+. Increase of the 
minimum diameter of cutting, and, to a lesser extent, extend-
ing the cutting cycle can increase carbon stocks but the 
opportunity costs will be significant for the companies. Given 
the current difficulties with the carbon markets and the low 
prices of carbon credits, prospects are limited. It is also 
unlikely that the so-called “voluntary market” could be an 
outlet for the carbon credits that might be made available by 
concessionaires through “REDD+ projects”, given the mixed 
perception of the industrial logging (and constant NGO 
campaigns against this activity). In addition, non-permanence 
is a serious issue, given the frequent changes in ownership of 
the concessions, and the risk of forest conversion. 
Moreover, the second “D” of REDD+ (avoided degrada-
tion) will well pave the way for “conservation concessions” 
that might be remunerated, rather than for “improved logging 
concessions”: although selective logging is not deforestation, 
it could be considered as a cause of degradation (even though 
potentially reversible). Thus, turning logging concessions 
into conservation concessions could qualify them as “avoided 
degradation” activities.
Consolidating the positive impact of forest certification 
through public incentives
In a context of relatively ineffective public forest policies, 
certification of “good management” has been a game-changer 
for six companies operating in Central Africa (another com-
pany, Decolvenaere, decided to abandon the FSC in 2015). 
All of them (but the CIB, which headquarters are in Singa-
pore) are EU-domiciled companies with large concessions, 
essentially targeting Western markets. Certification pushes 
companies to self-regulation with respect to existing legal 
norms, since a negative audit would mean jeopardizing their 
market shares in some EU markets. No new concessions have 
been certified during the last few years, which brings up 
the question of the potential for FSC certification to expand 
beyond the so-called “early-movers”. Not all certified compa-
nies have reached the same level of achievement. Some of 
them have reached an impressive level with respect to social 
criteria, rights recognition and the sharing of benefits with 
local communities. “Success stories” in Gabon and Congo are 
often cited (see for instance Hopkin, 2007), but these achieve-
ments are fragile since the related costs are often questioned 
by the shareholders of the international owner groups. 
The significant cost of investing in certification is not 
always compensated by a price premium (which sometimes 
does not exist). Several studies have attempted to calculate the 
financial cost of certification for companies operating in trop-
ical areas. A 2015 WWF study stated that “most of the studies 
provide only a lump sum figure without specifying the cost 
breakdown or cost drivers, and results vary widely” (Breukink 
et al. 2015, p. 7). These costs are estimated at around €7.63 
for a sample of large-scale certified tropical forests. But costs 
are embedded in business operations, which makes it difficult 
to isolate the specific costs of certification, especially if 
companies use the certification process to put their activities 
in full conformity with existing regulations, often already 
demanding but rarely fully implemented. Costs are generally 
expressed per cubic-meter rather than in hectares to take into 
account the existence of fixed costs, which may change the 
financial weight of certification operations.
A 2017 study by Oréade-Brèche for the PPECF6 attempted 
to evaluate the specific cost of FSC by distinguishing notably 
the “legal compliance” stage and the “certification” stage. 
The specific cost of the certification stage is estimated at 
around €2.2 per m3 per year for a 500,000 ha concession 
already fully compliant with existing regulations7. This is to 
be compared with the weight of the area fees (a fixed amount 
over years, that is easy to plan, collect and monitor) per cubic 
meter8 which varies between €2.18 (Gabon) and €6.5–€32 
(Cameroon, average of €19.6). Certification is considered to 
have a positive impact and to contribute to the public interest, 
and these figures suggest that cutting the area tax to the 
equivalent of €2.20 per cubic meter would cover the average 
specific costs of certification for an already legally-compliant 
company. 
Such a fiscal sacrifice for the government could be offset 
by annual financial transfers from REDD+ funds, either those 
managed by the World Bank Group or, possibly, the Green 
Climate Fund. A simple calculation (see Table 4) shows that 
close to full compensation for the cost of certification on the 
5.47 million ha currently under FSC certification would cost 
6
 Programme for the Promotion of Certified Forest Management in the Congo Basin, on behalf the PPECF/COMIFAC (Central African Forests 
Commission).
7
 For a non-compliant company, the cost of upgrading to full legality may be the double.
8
 The conversion of the area fee to volume is given by the simple formula: [(area fee per ha) / (volume harvested per ha)] x [rotation length]. 
We have adopted a conservative value of 8 m3 of commercial volume per hectare, which reflects more or less the current practices in Gabon, 
Cameroon and Congo.
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the international community around €3.55 million per annum, 
and a doubling of the certified area (from 5.65 to 11.3 million 
ha) would cost around €7.1 million. Concretely, it would 
mean a tax cut equivalent to the full amount of the area fee of 
XAF 413 for every company, actually slightly more than the 
area fee in Gabon (XAF 400) and in the northern Congo 
(XAF 350). In those cases, a tax credit for certified companies 
can be applied to compensate evenly certified concessions in 
the different countries.
This seems affordable considering the benefits of FSC 
certification in terms of improved management, legal compli-
ance, and social benefits for the local populations, which 
have been highlighted in recent studies (Cerutti et al. 2016b, 
Tsanga et al. 2014). To give a benchmark figure, the total 
REDD+ funding committed for the DRC alone was USD 264 
million by the end of 2014 (approx. €245 million)9. Such a 
compensation scheme would not have to be permanent, but if 
maintained for around a decade, it could boost the number of 
certified companies, increase the supply of certified timber 
(thereby encouraging retailers to systematically propose 
certified products), and allow companies to benefit in many 
ways from certification schemes.
CONCLUSIONS
With the increasing demographic density in many landscapes 
and needs for more agriculture land in Central Africa, the 
room for large-scale forest concessions is shrinking (except in 
Gabon, Republic of Congo and parts of DRC). Competition 
from other land-uses and other tenure systems (small-scale 
enterprises, private or community-based) has become more 
acute. There are two possible scenarios for the next 15–20 
years:
• Progressive fragmentation of most of the concessions 
(except in some remote parts of a handful of coun-
tries), with massive land conversion to agribusiness 
or small-scale agriculture. This tendency will be 
associated with growing informalisation of the timber 
activity (including community forestry, which will 
remain largely unregulated) and a declining export 
sector. In parallel, the development of intensive 
plantations to substitute the shrinking natural forest 
production can be expected, if important land tenure 
issues are settled in the next future.
• Evolution of the concession system from mono-
exploitation (timber) to a multi-spectrum of activities, 
mixing sustainable timber harvesting and valorisation 
of non-timber forest resources, genetic resources, 
agroforestry production, recreational hunting, energy 
production and distribution. . . Such “concessions 2.0” 
(see Karsenty and Vermeulen 2016) would require an 
evolution of the legal framework and public policies 
favouring such diversification, as it has started in 
Congo with recreational hunting associated with 
timber management on the same concessions’ area. 
This would be acceptable only with the recognition of 
communities’ customary territories within the conces-
sions, to develop jointly such new economic activities 
with the concerned populations. 
In the short term, desirable government’s efforts would 
be to rethink sectoral and cross-sectoral policies in order to 
address the causes of the decline of the regulated timber 
production (the one associated with the concessions imple-
menting management plans). This is essentially a question of 
political will since forestry is not being seen as an asset for the 
“emergence”. Disappointment vis-à-vis the financial promis-
es of REDD+ played a large role in the current low priority 
given to the forests in Central Africa. Levelling the playing 
field between committed concessionaires and other loggers 
would be one of the priorities, and numerous public policy 
instruments can be mobilized toward this objective. 
Foreign donors could play a role in supporting committed 
concessionaires in their efforts to take better advantage of 
forest management certification. Recognising the public 
interest of private certification schemes in a context of virtu-
ally ineffective public policies and poor governance would 
not be detrimental to efforts to reinforce administration, help 
governments to improve their regulatory framework, and 
ensure consistency with forest-related policies, i.e. policies in 
other sectors that affect the forests. Since “price premiums” 
associated with certified timber are often not persuasive 
enough for concessionaires, given the diversity of markets 
and their uneven maturity, incentives could be set at the 
9
 http://reddx.forest-trends.org
TABLE 4 Specific cost of certification to be compensated (hypothesis of an average 8 m3 per ha of commercial volume, specific 
cost of certification of €2.20 per m3)
Certified area 
(ha)
Cutting cycle 
(years)
Exploited 
annually (ha)
Annual theoretical 
production (m3)
Specific cost of 
certification (€)
Mean cost/ha 
certified
Gabon 2,042,616 25 81,705 653,637 1,438,002
Cameroon 1,130,301 30 37,677 301,414 663,110
Congo 2,478,943 30 82,631 661,051 1,454,313 
Total 5,651,860 1,616,102 3,555,425 € 0.63 [XAF 413]
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production level, through national budget-compensated tax 
cuts for certified companies. Furthermore, non-fiscal incen-
tives could be introduced, such as longer concession 
contracts, like the 60-year tenure for certified areas that was 
recently decided in Sarawak10.
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